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Abstract
In this paper we present a rudimentary model for low-latency anonymous communication systems. Specifically, we
study distributed OR algorithm as an abstract of the system. Based on our model, we give several satisfactory lower
bounds of anonymity leakage of a deterministic OR algorithm. Some of them reveal a trade-off between anonymity
and communication complexity. For the randomized OR algorithm, we only give a relatively trivial but possibly tight
lower bound when leaving out communication complexity. And we find the relationship between our model and some
open case in the study of secret sharing scheme, if considering communication complexity.
1
1 Introduction
An anonymous communication system, as a concept introduced by Chaum [1] in 1981, hides the identities
of nodes or participants when they communicate. In recent years, it has gained more and more popularity
because of various motivations, e.g., threat of pervasive surveillance or personal privacy preferences. The
best-known deployed design, Tor [2], is used daily by about three million people [3]. For a survey on designing,
developing, and deploying systems for anonymous communication, see [4].
Anonymous communication systems can be classified into low-latency and high-latency systems. Gener-
ally speaking, high-latency designs, such as Mixminion [5] and Dissent [6], are secure even against a powerful
global passive adversary, at the cost of giving up real-time communication. In contrast, low-latency designs
are more vulnerable to attacks, resulting in a certain degree of anonymity leakage. In this paper we will focus
on low-latency systems. To be exact, our interest is how secure a low-latency anonymous communication
system could be. In other words, we wonder the theoretical bound of the performance of systems.
There are already various formalizations of anonymous communication systems such as AnoA [7] and
UC [8], which are complete frameworks for analyzing anonymous communication systems. However, these
frameworks are too complicated for our purpose, though they are powerful when dealing with a concrete
system or protocol. Instead, we will try to build a model as simple as we can, so that we will be able to derive
some meaningful result. The most important simplification is that we do not consider cryptography in our
model, although a variant of model will be introduced in Section 4.1, which is involved with cryptography to
some extent. Another simplification is that we only consider a brief moment of the system, without regarding
some complex dynamics of it, e.g., node churn in a peer-to-peer system1.
We can assume that the low-latency anonymous communication system we will study is message-based,
which means that the fundamental function of the system is to transmit messages among its nodes, where
every receiver of the message would not obtain any information about the sender. This assumption is
reasonable, since all types of anonymous communication systems can be reduced to message-based ones.
1.1 Modeling
Though a strict mathematical description of our model will be given in Section 2, it is necessary to briefly
explain in advance how we obtain the model and why we accept the model.
Low-Latency Anonymous Communication Systems. In order to build a general model for low-latency
anonymous communication systems, we should grasp the most essential property of them. Consider a low-
latency anonymous communication system with delay at most ∆. By correctness of the system, we can assert
that each node in the system can tell whether at least one node has sent some message to it in the last ∆ time.
In other words, suppose the network topology does not change in the last ∆ time, then let V be the collection
of all nodes in the system, t be a node in V , and I(v) = 1{v sent some message to t in the last ∆ time}.2
We have
Proposition 1.1. The low-latency anonymous communication system solves a distributed OR problem. To
be exact, node t can give the result of
∨
v∈V I(v).
3
The property above allows us to only focus on a simple distributed algorithm, if we can obtain some
meaningful result after doing so. Indeed, we will soon see that it does very well. To determine the precise
characteristic of the algorithm we will study, we should take the threat model into account.
Threat Model and Anonymity Metric. Generally speaking, an adversary is supposed to partly break
the anonymity of the system, by identifying the sender of some message or at least revealing some information
about it. There are many possible cases which may happen in the system. Among them, we are interested in
the case the adversary knows that a node t ∈ V recieved some message just now and that in the last ∆ time
there was only exactly one message transmitted by the system. There are two reasons for our interest. First,
apparently the model will be simpler in this case. Second, this is a plausible worst case, since more messages
transmitted meanwhile bring more difficulty to the adversary. We say that it is plausible because the system
1In such a system, nodes participate only for a short period of time, and the topology changes quickly.
2Symbol 1{P} takes value 1 if proposition P is true, or 0 if it is false.
3Surely it is feasible to replace
∨
v∈V
I(v) by
∑
v∈V
I(v) or something else for a stronger result, but it suffices for this paper
to use the former.
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has relatively low latency ∆, and the adversary can know that a node t ∈ V receieved some message in many
circumstances, e.g., when sender of the message is browsing the website controlled by the adversary, via the
proxy built on the system. To measure anonymity, we will use the classical entropy-based anonymity metric
[9, 10]. The remaining issue is to determine the adversary’s ability. In this paper, we mainly consider an
adversary who is external, passive and static, in terms of the standard terminology introduced by Raymond
[11]. However, it is possible to consider other types of adversaries by making some changes to our model,
which will be discussed in Section 5.2.
Computational Model. We will choose a synchronous model for distributed computing, which has
two advantages. First, although most of distributed systems are asynchronous in the real world, studying
synchronous model is still a good start because it is relatively simpler. Second, an adversary in synchronous
model is stronger than one in asynchronous model, because synchronicity eliminates some uncertainties for
the adversary. And unfortunately in the real-world case, a system often behaves more like a synchronous
one under existing attack techniques, e.g., end-to-end timing analysis [12, 13, 14].
1.2 Contribution
In this paper we present a rudimentary model to analyze performances of low-latency anonymous communi-
cation systems from theoretical aspect. To be specific, we study distributed OR algorithm as an abstract of
real-world low-latency anonymous communication systems. By introducing an external, passive and static
adversary, we define anonymity leakage of an OR algorithm, which is roughly consistent with the classical
metric defined in practice.
After, we obtain some elementary results with our model. Then, for deterministic OR algorithm, we give
several lower bounds of anonymity leakage. Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 4.9 give us general bounds, whatever
the network topology is. Theorem 3.6 and Corollary 4.7 give us stronger bounds if the network topology
can be specified by a relatively sparse graph, which usually corresponds to the case a real-world system is
peer-to-peer with restricted topologies, e.g., Tarzan [15] and ShadowWalker [16]. Among them, Corollary
4.7 and Theorem 4.9 show a trade-off between anonymity and communication complexity. For randomized
case, we give a relatively trivial but possibly tight bound in Corollary 3.4. Unlike in the deterministic case,
we find out the relationship between our model and some open case in the study of secret sharing scheme,
if considering communication complexity.
Finally, we discuss about the tightness issue on our bounds and something else related to our subject.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Computational Model
Throughout this paper, we study the standard LOCAL model [17, 18] for distributed computing. It is also
called synchronous network model [19] sometimes. We will just make a rough introduction here, and formal
definition of the model can be found in [18].
Basic Concept. In the LOCAL model, processors and bidirectional communication channels between them
are represented by nodes and edges of a connected undirected underlying graph G = (V,E), respectively.
With replicas of an algorithm Π running at all nodes, the computation proceeds in synchronized rounds. In
each round, every node v ∈ V can receive messages sent by its neighbors in the previous round, do some
local computation, and send at most one message to each its neighbor separately. There is no restrictions
on local computations, so we can simply regard every replica of Π residing at v ∈ V , called process v, as a
(possibly infinite) state machine, which is more powerful than a Turing machine [20]. For convenience, we
require any algorithm Π to be fundamentally deterministic in this paper.
Initial Input, Execution and History. An initial input I : V → I states what information each node
v ∈ V would get at the very beginning of computation, where I stands for the collection of possible inputs
for a node. An execution governed by algorithm Π on underlying graph G = (V,E) with initial input I is
denoted ηΠG(I). For each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E we define history
hηe = h
η
(u,v) = (h
η
u→v, h
η
v→u) ∈ M
ω ×Mω
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as the communication history of edge e under execution η = ηΠG(I), which composed of two components
for two direction of the communication, where M stands for the collection of possible messages (including
empty message denoted λ) sent by some node through an edge within a round, and ω is the smallest infinite
ordinal. To be specific, hηu→v = (m1,m2, . . . ) indicates that u sent a message mk to v in round k under η
for all k ∈ Z+. We also define prefix of a history by
(hηe)[k] = ((h
η
u→v)[k], (h
η
v→u)[k]) and (h
η
u→v)[k] = (m1, . . . ,mk)
where hηu→v = (m1,m2, . . . ) and k ∈ N.
Randomness. In order to analyze a randomized algorithm, we allow every node v ∈ V to acquire some
extra information at the very beginning of computation from the random input R : V → {0, 1}ω. Hence,
each node v ∈ V would hold an infinite binary string assigned by R. An execution governed by algorithm
Π on underlying graph G with initial input I and random input R is denoted ηΠG(I, R). If we let a random
variable R satisfy that every bit of R(v) for every v ∈ V are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed on {0, 1}, we
can achieve randomness by studying ηΠG(I,R).
Conventions. Recall that we have assumed any algorithm Π in this paper to be deterministic. So in the
following text if we say that Π is a randomized algorithm, we actually mean that Π takes random input R.
We omit “connected” and “undirected” when we refer to an underlying graph G by default. Throughout this
paper, we always let every node v ∈ V be initially aware of the underlying graph G and its ID “v”. Namely,
complete topological knowledge of the network is always assumed to be included in I(v) for every v ∈ V .
However, for simplicity, we will abuse notation by leaving out these information when defining or using the
symbol I. For random input R written as a random variable, we always follow the definition in the previous
paragraph. Hence we will no longer define R when referring to it in the following text. Furthermore, note
that a deterministic algorithm is randomized for sure. Therefore without loss of generality we only study
the randomized case when an algorithm is not specified to be whether randomized or deterministic.
By the nature of deterministic state machine we have
Theorem 2.1. Let G = (V,E) be an underlying graph, v0 ∈ V be a node, Π be an algorithm and I, I
′ be
inputs satisfying I(v0) = I
′(v0). Denote η = η
Π
G(I) and η
′ = ηΠG(I
′). If (hηv→v0)[k] = (h
η′
v→v0)[k] for all v ∈ V
adjacent to v0 in G, the state of process v0 under η would be identical to that under η
′ from round 1 to round
k+1. In addition, (hηv0→v)[k+1] = (h
η′
v0→v)[k+1] holds for all v ∈ V adjacent to v in G. Also, there is a same
conclusion for η = ηΠG(I, R) and η
′ = ηΠG(I
′, R′) where I(v0) = I
′(v0) and R(v0) = R
′(v0).
We omit the proof of this fundamental theorem since the formal definition of the LOCAL model has not
present here. However, it has been used in lots of works, in spite of maybe being in different forms. For
example, it serves the same function as indistinguishability does in Lynch’s textbook [19].
Distributed OR Algorithm. Generally speaking, given an underlying graph G = (V,E) in which every
node has an initial binary bit, an algorithm Π is called OR algorithm if some nodes finally could tell whether
there exists a node holding “1” or not. We give the formal definition as follows.
Definition 2.2 (OR algorithm). Let G = (V,E) be an underlying graph, T be a non-empty subset of V ,
I = {0, 1}, and Π be an algorithm. Suppose for arbitrary initial input I : V → I and arbitrary random input
R if randomness is introduced, every process v ∈ T would finally terminate with state qs under execution
ηΠG(I) or η
Π
G(I, R), where s =
∨
v∈V I(v), within k0 rounds for some k0 ∈ N. Then we call Π an OR algorithm
on underlying graph G with target set T .
When discussing OR algorithm, we often refer to some particular initial input I : V → {0, 1}. For
convenience we define them as follows.
I0 : v 7→ 0
Iu : v 7→ 1{u = v}
2.2 Threat Model and Anonymity Metric
Suppose there is an OR algorithm Π on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T , and an execution
η = ηΠG(I) or η
Π
G(I,R), where initial input I and random input R are random variables. We consider an
adversary who
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a) has unlimited computational power,
b) knows Π, G, T but does not know η,
c) is sure that there exists a unique node v ∈ V holding “1” called initiator (and it is actually true), but
does not have further a priori knowledge on I,
d) can eavesdrop on some edges e ∈ F ⊆ E during execution η.
By c) we mean that I is uniformly distributed on the set {Iv : v ∈ V }. By d) we mean that the adversary
can observe hηe for each edge e ∈ F . The adversary’s ultimate objective is to identify the initiator, i.e.,
to determine I. However, a complete identification is impossible in most cases. Even so, the adversary do
learn some information about the initiator, or I. Taking a) and b) into account, the adversary’s ability
of identification is only limited by information theory. So we use the entropy of I conditioned on the
adversary’s observation O, or H (I|O), to define anonymity of the initiator. For example, if F = ∅ so that
the adversary can not derive anything about I from its observation, anonymity of the initiator should be
H (I|O) = H (I) = logn bits4, where n = |V | is the number of nodes in G. Since we concern about the
leakage of anonymity, we will use the metric
I (I;O) = H (I)−H(I|O)
to measure the anonymity of a certain algorithm Π. Obviously the less it is, the more anonymity Π provided
to the initiator in a given underlying graph.
Definition 2.3 (Anonymity Leakage). Let Π be an OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with
target set T , F be a subset of E, I be uniformly distributed on the set {Iv : v ∈ V }, η = η
Π
G(I) or η
Π
G(I ,R),
and O = (hηe : e ∈ F ).
5 The anonymity leakage is defined by
ΦΠG,T (F ) = I (I;O)
where I is the mutual information symbol.
If Π is deterministic, I can determine O so that H (O|I) = 0, we have
ΦΠG,T (F ) = I (I;O) = H (O)−H(O|I) = H (O) .
3 Lower Bound of Anonymity Leakage
3.1 Randomized Case
The following theorem tells us that target set T is not important in most cases, when considering anonymity
leakage.
Theorem 3.1. Let Π be a randomized OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T .
Then for arbitrary ∅ 6= T ′ ⊆ V , there exists an OR algorithm Π′ on G with T ′ such that
ΦΠG,T (F ) = Φ
Π′
G,T ′(F )
holds for arbitrary F ⊆ E.
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing Π′. Firstly, Π′ acts like Π until round k0, where k0 depending
on Π is defined in Definition 2.2. Then, every processor v ∈ T knows the value of s =
∨
v∈V I(v) since Π
is an OR algorithm. Π′ lets all processors v ∈ T start broadcasting the value of s just in round k0 + 1.
The broadcast is achieved by some deterministic distributed broadcast algorithm included in Π′. Finally, all
processors v ∈ V , including those in T ′, would know the value of s because G is connected. So Π′ is an OR
algorithm on G with T ′.
Now consider the difference between hηe and h
η′
e , where η = η
Π
G(I, R) and η
′ = ηΠ
′
G (I, R) with arbitrary I
and R. Note that Π′ always does the same thing regardless of which value I and R would take. Therefore,
4logn = log2 n.
5(f(x) : x ∈ X) denote a vector in Y X , where Y is the codomain of f .
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if someone know one of hηe and h
η′
e , the another can be inferred, or determined, without any information
of I and R. As a result, the conclusion also holds between O and O′, where O = (hηe : e ∈ F ) and
O′ = (hη
′
e : e ∈ F ) for arbitrary F ⊆ E. Thus,
ΦΠG,T (F ) = I (I;O) = I
(
I;O,O′
)
= I
(
I;O′
)
= ΦΠ
′
G,T ′(F ),
where I is uniformly distributed on the set {Iv : v ∈ V }.
Then we arrive at the following theorem, which is elementary but important. Actually, it could be easily
deduced from some most basic fact in communication complexity theory, which was introduced by Yao [21]
in 1979. However, we will still make a rigid proof because it is more tedious to show that our model is
compatible with Yao’s.
Theorem 3.2. Let K2 be the graph consisting of two nodes u and v, which are connected by a single edge
e. Then any randomized OR algorithm Π on K2 with arbitrary target set T will satisfy that
hηue 6= h
ηv
e ,
where ηu = η
Π
K2
(Iu, Ru) and ηv = η
Π
K2
(Iv, Rv) with arbitrary Ru and Rv.
Proof. Prove by contradiction. Suppose hηue = h
ηv
e . Without loss of generality assume u ∈ T . Let η0 =
ηΠK2(I0, R0) where R0(u) = Rv(u) and R0(v) = Ru(v). Note that I0(u) = Iv(u) = 0 and I0(v) = Iu(v) = 0.
Using Theorem 2.1 by substituting u or v for v0 in it respectively, we get{
(hηvv→u)[k] = (h
η0
v→u)[k] =⇒ (h
ηv
u→v)[k+1] = (h
η0
u→v)[k+1]
(hηuu→v)[k] = (h
η0
u→v)[k] =⇒ (h
ηu
v→u)[k+1] = (h
η0
v→u)[k+1]
Since hηue = h
ηv
e , by induction on k we have h
ηu
e = h
η0
e = h
ηv
e . However, using Theorem 2.1 again for u with
ηv and η0 we get that the state of process u under ηv is identical to that under η0 forever. By Definition 2.2
this with u ∈ T gives us Iv(u) ∨ Iv(v) = I0(u) ∨ I0(v), which implies 1 = 0. Absurd.
We can generalize Theorem 3.2 by using a well-known technique of reduction, which was possibly first
introduced by Lamport et al. [22].
Corollary 3.3. Let Π be a randomized OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T and
u, v be two nodes in G. Suppose that there is a set of edges F ⊆ E whose removal disconnects u from v.
Then,
OuF = (h
ηu
e : e ∈ F ) 6= (h
ηv
e : e ∈ F ) = O
v
F ,
where ηu = η
Π
G(Iu, Ru) and ηv = η
Π
G(Iv, Rv) with arbitrary Ru and Rv.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that OuF = O
v
F . We will construct an deterministic OR algorithm
Π′ on K2 violating Theorem 3.2. Define Vu as the collection of nodes which are in the same connected
component with u in graph (V,E − F ). And Vv is defined in a similar way. Without loss of generality we
can assume that there exists a node t ∈ T not included in Vv. Let x and y be the two nodes in K2. We
construct Π′ as follows.
In general, Π′ under execution ηΠ
′
K2
(I ′) let processes x and y keep simulating the execution ηΠG(I, R), step
by step. To be specific, in round k, x keep track of the states of all the processes in V −Vv in the k-th round
of ηΠG(I, R), as well as the messages among them. Similarly, y is responsible for Vv. They assign the initial
input and random input by
∀w ∈ V, I(w) =


I ′(x), w = u
I ′(y), w = v
0, else
∀w ∈ V − Vv, R(w) =
{
Ru(w), if I
′(x) = 1
Rv(w), if I
′(x) = 0
∀w ∈ Vv, R(w) =
{
Rv(w), if I
′(y) = 1
Ru(w), if I
′(y) = 0
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which obviously can be achieved without information exchange between x and y. The remaining question is
to simulate those messages between a process in V − Vv and one in Vv. Actually this part will be the only
use of the edge (x, y) in K2 by Π
′. Those simulated messages generated in a round under ηΠG(I, R) will be
sent through the edge by some deterministic coding at once. The coding should guarantee that the reciver
can obtain enough information from it to continue simulating. When x finds that simulated t terminates
with state qs, it also terminates with the same state.
It is easy to see that Π′ is an OR algorithm with target set {x}, so we will not do rigid reasoning here.
Since V − Vv and Vv are disconnected in graph (V,E − F ), by definition of Π
′, h
ηΠ
′
K2
(I′)
(x,y) can be determined
by (h
ηΠG(I,R)
e : e ∈ F ). Furthermore, note that processes in ηΠ
′
K2
(Ix) and η
Π′
K2
(Iy) simulates η
Π
G(Iu, Ru)
and ηΠG(Iv, Rv), respectively. Therefore by supposition O
u
F = O
v
F , we conclude h
ηΠ
′
K2
(Ix)
(x,y) = h
ηΠ
′
K2
(Iy)
(x,y) for Π
′.
Absurd.
By Corollary 3.3, we obtain our first result on anonymity leakage as follows.
Corollary 3.4. Let Π be a randomized OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T .
Then, for arbitrary F ⊆ E we have
ΦΠG,T (F ) ≥ logn+
∑
Vi
ni
n
log
ni
n
where n = |V |, ni = |Vi|, and Vi runs through node set of every connected component in graph (V,E − F ).
Proof. Note that if we can always determine which Vi v is in from an arbitrary O = (h
ηΠG(Iv ,R)
e : e ∈ F ),
the inequality will immediately follow by ΦΠG,T (F ) = I (I;O) = H (I) − H(I|O) in Definition 2.3. Let
OVi = {(h
ηΠG(Iv ,R)
e : e ∈ F ) : v ∈ Vi}. Certainly we have O ∈
⋃
Vi
OVi . Now we only need to prove that all
OVi are mutually disjoint. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that OVi ∩ OVj 6= ∅ with some Vi, Vj such
that Vi 6= Vj . We choose an O ∈ OVi ∩ OVj . By definition of OVi we have
(h
ηΠG(Iu,Ru)
e : e ∈ F ) = O = (h
ηΠG(Iv ,Rv)
e : e ∈ F )
for some u ∈ Vi, v ∈ Vj , which violates Corollary 3.3.
3.2 Deterministic Case
Lemma 3.5 is the result of Corollary 3.3 in the deterministic case, which will be very useful when proving
our lower bounds of anonymity leakage in this section.
Lemma 3.5. Let Π be a deterministic OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T and
u, v be two nodes in G. Define
F = {e ∈ E : hηue 6= h
ηv
e },
where ηu = η
Π
G(Iu) and ηv = η
Π
G(Iv). Then, u and v are connected in graph (V, F ). In particular, |F | ≥
dG(u, v).
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Proof. If u and v are unconnected in (V, F ), the removal of E−F in G will disconnect u from v. By Corollary
3.3 we have
(hηue : e ∈ E − F ) 6= (h
ηv
e : e ∈ E − F )
which contradicts with the definition of F . The dG(u, v) bound of |F | is a direct inference of the fact that
F connects u and v.
6dG(u, v) denotes the distance between two nodes u and v in G.
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Theorem 3.6. Let Π be a deterministic OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T .
Denote n = |V | and m = |E|. The distance between two nodes u and v in G is denoted dG(u, v). Then, the
following inequality on anonymity leakage holds for arbitrary k ∈ N.
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
ΦΠG,T ({e1, . . . , ek}) ≥ − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
(
1−
dG(u, v)
m
)k
Alternatively, for arbitrary p ∈ [0, 1] we have
E
(
ΦΠG,T (F )
)
≥ − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
(1− p)dG(u,v)


where distribution of F is given by that each edge e ∈ E have possibility p to be included in F independently.
Proof. The key of the proof is that for a random variable X we always have
H (X) ≥ H2 (X)
where H2 (X) is the collision entropy, or Re´nyi entropy of order 2, defined by
H2 (X) = − logPr (X = Y )
where X and Y are i.i.d. This can be easily deduced by Jensen’s inequality (see [23, p. 428]). Because of
determinism of Π, by Definition 2.3 we have
ΦΠG,T (F ) = H (O) ≥ H2 (O)
where I is uniformly distributed on the set {Iv : v ∈ V }. With shorthand h
v
e = h
ηΠG(Iv)
e we obtain
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
ΦΠG,T ({e1, . . . , ek})
≥
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
H2
(
h
ηΠG(I)
ei : i = 1, . . . , k
)
=
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
− log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
k∏
i=1
1{huei = h
v
ei
}


≥ − log

 1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
k∏
i=1
1{huei = h
v
ei
}


= − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
k∏
i=1
1{huei = h
v
ei
}


= − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
(
1
m
∑
e∈E
1{hue = h
v
e}
)k
= − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
(
1
m
(
m−
∑
e∈E
1{hue 6= h
v
e}
))k
≥ − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
(
1
m
(m− dG(u, v))}
)k
= − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
(
1−
dG(u, v)
m
)k .
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The first “≥” holds by the property of collision entropy we have discussed. The second “≥” follows from
Jensen’s inequality since − log(x) is convex. The third “≥” is derived from Lemma 3.5. Similarly we also
obatin
E
(
ΦΠG,T (F )
)
≥ E
(
H2
(
h
ηΠG(I)
e : e ∈ F
))
=
∑
F⊆E
p|F |(1− p)|E−F | · − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
∏
e∈F
1{hue = h
v
e}


≥ − log

∑
F⊆E
p|F |(1− p)|E−F |
1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
∏
e∈F
1{hue = h
v
e}


= − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
∑
F⊆E
p|F |(1− p)|E−F |
∏
e∈F
1{hue = h
v
e}


= − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
∑
F⊆E
∏
e∈E−F
(1− p)
∏
e∈F
p · 1{hue = h
v
e}


= − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
∏
e∈E
(1− p+ p · 1{hue = h
v
e})


= − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
∏
e∈E
(1− p · 1{hue 6= h
v
e})


≥ − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
(1− p)dG(u,v)

 .
Suppose Π is a deterministic OR algorithm on G with T . Then in its underlying graph G = (V,E) every
F ⊆ E actually induces an equivalence relation ∼F on V , which can be defined by
u ∼F v iff O
u
F = O
v
F
where symbol OvF stands for (h
ηΠG(Iv)
e : e ∈ F ). Let c(F ) be the number of equivalence classes split by relation
∼F . We have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7. Let F be an arbitrary subset of E.
a) There are at least n− c(F ) different e ∈ E − F such that c(F ∪ {e}) ≥ c(F ) + 1.
b) ΦΠG,T (F ) ≥
c(F )− 1
n− 1
logn.
Proof. Denote hue = h
ηΠG(Iu)
e . Consider the edge set of G,⋃
u,v∈V
u∼F v
{e ∈ E : hue 6= h
v
e}
= {e ∈ E : ∃u, v ∈ V, u ∼F v, h
u
e 6= h
v
e}
= {e ∈ E : ∃u, v ∈ V, u ∼F v, u ≁F∪{e} v}
On one hand, the right-hand side shows that any of its element e, which is obviously not in F , gives an
equivalence relation ∼F∪{e} splitting V into more than c(F ) equivalence classes. On the other hand, the left-
hand side implies that it connects u to v in G if u ∼F v, by Lemma 3.5. So it includes at least n−c(F ) edges,
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which follows from that it contains a spanning forest consisting of c(F ) spanning trees for c(F ) equivalence
classes, respectively. Therefore a) holds.
For b), suppose ∼F split V into k equivalence classes V1, . . . , Vk. Denote n = |V | and ni = |Vi| for
i = 1, . . . , k. By Definition 2.3 we have
ΨΠG,T (F ) = H (O) = −
k∑
i=1
ni
n
log
ni
n
.
Applying Theorem A.1 with m = 1 we immediately get the result.
Theorem 3.8. Let Π be a deterministic OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T .
Denote n = |V | and m = |E|. Then, the following inequality on anonymity leakage holds for arbitrary k ∈ N.
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
ΦΠG,T ({e1, . . . , ek}) ≥
(
1−
(
1−
1
m
)k)
logn
Alternatively, for arbitrary p ∈ [0, 1] we have
E
(
ΦΠG,T (F )
)
≥ p logn
where distribution of F is given by that each edge e ∈ E have possibility p to be included in F independently.
Proof. By Lemma 3.7 b), to verify the first inequality we only need to prove
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
c({e1, . . . , ek})− 1
n− 1
≥ 1−
(
1−
1
m
)k
We do by induction on k.
• Basis. It is trivial when k = 0.
• Inductive step. Suppose we have an edge set F ⊆ E. By Lemma 3.7 a),∑
e∈E
c(F ∪ {e}) ≥ m · c(F ) + (n− c(F )) = (m− 1)c(F ) + n
Combining this and induction hypothesis we can complete the step.
1
mk+1
∑
e1,...,ek+1∈E
c({e1, . . . , ek+1})− 1
n− 1
=
1
mk+1
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
∑
ek+1∈E
c({e1, . . . , ek} ∪ {ek+1})− 1
n− 1
≥
1
mk+1
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
(m− 1)c({e1, . . . , ek}}) + n−m
n− 1
=
m− 1
m
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
c({e1, . . . , ek}})− 1
n− 1
+
1
mk+1
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
n− 1
n− 1
≥
m− 1
m
(
1−
(
1−
1
m
)k)
+
1
m
= 1−
(
1−
1
m
)k+1
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Next we verify the second inequality. Similarly, by Lemma 3.7 it is enough if
∑
F⊆E
p|F |(1 − p)|E−F |
c(F )− 1
n− 1
≥ p
⇐= ∀k ∈ N,
∑
F⊆E
|F |=k
c(F )− 1
n− 1
≥
(
m− 1
k − 1
)
We prove it by induction as well.
• Basis. It is trivial when k = 0.
• Inductive step. Likewise, by Lemma 3.7 a),∑
e∈E−F
c(F ∪ {e}) ≥ (m− k)c(F ) + (n− c(F )) = (m− k − 1)c(F ) + n
Therefore,
∑
F⊆E
|F |=k+1
c(F )− 1
n− 1
=
1
k + 1
∑
F⊆E
|F |=k
∑
e∈E−F
c(F ∪ {e})− 1
n− 1
≥
1
k + 1
∑
F⊆E
|F |=k
(m− k − 1)c(F ) + n− (m− k)
n− 1
=
m− k − 1
k + 1
∑
F⊆E
|F |=k
c(F )− 1
n− 1
+
1
k + 1
∑
F⊆E
|F |=k
n− 1
n− 1
≥
m− k − 1
k + 1
(
m− 1
k − 1
)
+
1
k + 1
(
m
k
)
=
(
m− 1
k
)
4 Trade-off between Anonymity and Communication Complexity
The communication complexity is typically measured in terms of the total number of non-empty messages
that are sent. Note that we do not consider the number of bits in messages here.
Definition 4.1 (Communication Complexity). Let Π be an algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E).
Then the worst-case communication complexity is defined by
αG(Π) = sup
I,R
{∑
e∈E
|h
ηΠG(I,R)
e |
}
where |hηe | = |h
η
u→v|+ |h
η
v→u|, in which e = (u, v) and |h
η
u→v| stands for the number of non-empty messages
in hηu→v = (m1,m2, . . . ), i.e., |h
η
u→v| =
∑
i∈Z+ 1{mi 6= λ}. Likewise, the average-case communication
complexity is defined by
βG(Π, I) = E
(∑
e∈E
|h
ηΠG(I,R)
e |
)
.
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4.1 Deterministic Case
It is hard for us to improve the result about anonymity leakage in Section 3.2 even if we restrict communica-
tion complexity of the algorithm. However, we can find a trade-off between anonymity and communication
complexity, if we consider a slightly different threat model. That is, the adversary can not distinguish be-
tween two non-empty messages. This model corresponds to the case where communication is protected by
a semantically secure cryptosystem in the real world. One should note that though we are studying the
deterministic case in this section, the model works for the randomized case too.
Definition 4.2. Let Π be an OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T , F be a subset
of E, I be uniformly distributed on the set {Iv : v ∈ V }, η = η
Π
G(I) or η
Π
G(I,R). Define δ(h
η
e) ∈ {0, 1}
ω for
e = (u, v) by
δ(hηe) = (δ(h
η
u→v), δ(h
η
v→u))
and
δ(hηu→v) = (1{m1 6= λ},1{m2 6= λ}, . . . )
with hηu→v = (m1,m2, . . . ). Let O = (δ(h
η
e ) : e ∈ F ). The anonymity leakage with binary filter is defined by
ΨΠG,T (F ) = I (I;O) .
Lemma 4.3. Use the same symbols as in Definition 4.2. Define
O∗ = (|h
ηΠG(I,R)
e | : e ∈ F ).
Then we have ΨΠG,T (F ) ≥ I (I;O
∗), or H(O∗) when Π is deterministic.
Proof. Obviously O determines O∗. Hence
ΨΠG,T (F ) = I (I;O) = I (I;O,O
∗) ≥ I (I;O∗) .
If Π is deterministic, I determines O∗, thus I (I;O∗) = H (O∗).
Lemma 4.4. Let h and h′ be histories. h 6= h′ implies |h| 6= |h′| or |h|, |h′| > 0.
Proof. Trivial.
Definition 4.5 (Active Edges). For a certain execution η on underlying graph G = (V,E), its active edges
is a set defined as the collection of those edges by which at least one (non-empty) message is transmitted
under η.
A (η) = {e ∈ E : |hηe | > 0}
Let G = (V,E) be a graph. To obtain a result like Theorem 3.6, for E0 ⊆ E we define d
∗
G(u, v;E0) as
follows.
d∗G(u, v;E0) = inf
F⊆E
{|F − E0| : F connects u to v}
Theorem 4.6. Let Π be a deterministic OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T .
Denote n = |V | and m = |E|. Suppose Av = A (η
Π
G(Iv)) for each v ∈ V . Then, the following inequality on
anonymity leakage holds for arbitrary k ∈ N.
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
ΨΠG,T ({e1, . . . , ek}) ≥ − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
(
1−
d∗G(u, v;Au ∩Av)
m
)k
Alternatively, for arbitrary p ∈ [0, 1] we have
E
(
ΨΠG,T (F )
)
≥ − log

 1
n2
∑
u,v∈V
(1− p)
d∗G(u,v;Au∩Av)


where distribution of F is given by that each edge e ∈ E have possibility p to be included in F independently.
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Proof. By Lemma 4.3, ΨΠG,T (F ) ≥ H(O
∗) ≥ H2 (O
∗). Denote hve = h
ηΠG(Iv)
e . We only need to show that
|{e ∈ E : |hue | 6= |h
v
e |}| ≥ d
∗
G(u, v;Au ∩Av)
because the remaining work is almost the same as in proving Theorem 3.6. By Lemma 4.4 we have
{e ∈ E : |hue | 6= |h
v
e |} ⊇ {e ∈ E : h
u
e 6= h
v
e} − {e ∈ E : |h
u
e |, |h
v
e | > 0}
= {e ∈ E : hue 6= h
v
e} − (Au ∩Av)
Comparing this with Lemma 3.5 and definition of d∗ we reach the goal.
Corollary 4.7. Let Π be a deterministic OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T .
Denote n = |V | and m = |E| and suppose α = αG(Π). Let G[U ] denote the subgraph induced in G by U and
dG(U, v) = infu∈U{dG(u, v)}. Then, the following inequality on anonymity leakage holds for arbitrary k ∈ N.
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
ΨΠG,T ({e1, . . . , ek}) ≥ − log

 1n2
∑
u∈V
inf
u∈U⊆V
|U|≤α+1
G[U ] connected
{∑
v∈V
(
1−
dG(U, v)
m
)k}


Alternatively, for arbitrary p ∈ [0, 1] we have
E
(
ΨΠG,T (F )
)
≥ − log

 1n2
∑
u∈V
inf
u∈U⊆V
|U|≤α+1
G[U ] connected
{∑
v∈V
(1− p)
dG(U,v)
}
where distribution of F is given by that each edge e ∈ E have possibility p to be included in F independently.
Suppose Π is a deterministic OR algorithm on G with T . Like what we do in Section 3.2, we define an
equivalence relation ∼∗F on V by
u ∼∗F v iff O
∗u
F = O
∗v
F
where O∗vF stands for (|h
ηΠG(Iv)
e | : e ∈ F ). Suppose there are k equivalence classes V1, . . . , Vk under ∼
∗
F .
Denote n = |V | and ni = |Vi| and suppose α = αG(Π) < n− 1. With definition
χ∗(F ) =
k∑
i=1
min{α+ 1, ni}
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.8. Let F be an arbitrary subset of E.
a) There are at least n− χ∗(F ) different e ∈ E − F such that χ∗(F ∪ {e}) ≥ χ∗(F ) + 1.
b) ΨΠG,T (F ) ≥
χ∗(F )− (α+ 1)
n− (α+ 1)
log
n
α+ 1
.
Proof. For any equivalence class Vi with ni > α+1 we arbitrarily choose a node u ∈ Vi. Denote h
v
e = h
ηΠG(Iv)
e .
By Lemma 4.4 we have
{e ∈ E : ∃v ∼∗F u, u ≁
∗
F∪{e} v}
= {e ∈ E : ∃v ∼∗F u, |h
u
e | 6= |h
v
e |}
⊇ {e ∈ E : ∃v ∼∗F u, h
u
e 6= h
v
e} − {e ∈ E : ∃v ∼
∗
F u, |h
u
e |, |h
v
e | > 0}
⊇
⋃
v∈V
v∼∗F u
{e ∈ E : hue 6= h
v
e} −A (η
Π
G(Iu))
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By Lemma 3.5 the first term in the right-hand side has at least ni − 1 edges since it connects Vi. And
certainly |A (ηΠG(Iu))| ≤ α. So the left-hand side includes at least ni −α− 1 edges. We show that each edge
e in it satisfies χ∗(F ∪ {e}) > χ∗(F ), by rewriting
χ∗(F ) =
k∑
i=1
min {α+ 1, ni} =
∑
v∈V
min
{
α+ 1
|[v]∼∗
F
|
, 1
}
where [v]∼ stands for the equivalence class under relation ∼ including u. Because each Vi for i = 1, . . . , n
gives us at least max{0, ni − α − 1} edges we want, summing them up we have at least n − χ
∗(F ) edges.
Therefore a) holds.
For b), by Lemma 4.3 we have
ΨΠG,T (F ) ≥ H(O
∗) = −
k∑
i=1
ni
n
log
ni
n
.
Applying Theorem A.1 with m = α+ 1 we immediately get the result.
Theorem 4.9. Let Π be a deterministic OR algorithm on underlying graph G = (V,E) with target set T .
Denote n = |V | and m = |E| and suppose α = αG(Π) < n− 1. Then, the following inequality on anonymity
leakage holds for arbitrary k ∈ N.
1
mk
∑
e1,...,ek∈E
ΨΠG,T ({e1, . . . , ek}) ≥
(
1−
(
1−
1
m
)k)
log
n
α+ 1
Alternatively, for arbitrary p ∈ [0, 1] we have
E
(
ΨΠG,T (F )
)
≥ p log
n
α+ 1
where distribution of F is given by that each edge e ∈ E have possibility p to be included in F independently.
Proof. The proof is almost the same as that for Theorem 3.8, except using Lemma 4.8 instead of Lemma
3.7.
4.2 Difficulty in Studying Randomized Case
In this section, we try to find out the essential difficulty in studying the randomized case when using
Corollary 3.3 as relaxation. Consider a simplest underlying graph G = (V,E), which includes only two
nodes u, v and n edges e1, . . . , en connecting them. Given a certain randomized OR algorithm Π on G, we
denote Xi = h
ηΠG(I,R)
ei for i = 1, . . . , n, where I is uniformly distributed on {Iu, Iv}. By plugging F = E
into Corollary 3.3 we obtain that X1, . . . ,Xn determine I. If the adversary can observe randomly k of
X1, . . . ,Xn, the expectation of anonymity leakage is
ǫ =
1(
n
k
) ∑
F⊆E
|F |=k
ΦΠG,T (F ) =
1(
n
k
) ∑
J⊆{1,...,n}
|J|=k
I (I; (Xi : i ∈ J))
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There does exist a trade-off between ǫ and
∑n
i=1 H(Xi) which clearly bounds the average-case communication
compleity βG(Π, I).
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)
≥
1
(n− k)
(
n
k
) ∑
J⊆{1,...,n}
|J|=k
H((Xi : i /∈ J))
≥
1
(n− k)
(
n
k
) ∑
J⊆{1,...,n}
|J|=k
I (I; (Xi : i /∈ J)|(Xi : i ∈ J))
=
1
(n− k)
(
n
k
) ∑
J⊆{1,...,n}
|J|=k
(I (I;X1, . . . ,Xn)− I (I; (Xi : i ∈ J)))
=
1
n− k
(H (I)− ǫ) =
1− ǫ
n− k
However we hardly consider it as a meaningful result, since we can only obtain
∑n
i=1H(Xi) ≥ 2 with a
relatively strong condition k = n/2 and ǫ = 0. On the other hand, we have not found a construction of
X1, . . . ,Xn to approach the bound given above even within a constant factor. In fact, if ǫ = 0, we arrive
at a special case called (k, n, n)-ramp scheme in the study of secret sharing scheme. Next we will briefly
introduce some necessary concepts about secret sharing scheme, which are mostly taken from [24] with some
modification.
Let P be a set of n parties, i.e., |P| = n. A collection of subsets A ⊆ 2P is monotone if for every B ∈ A
and B ⊆ C it holds that C ∈ A. The collection is anti-monotone if for every B ∈ A and C ⊆ B it holds
that C ∈ A.
Definition 4.10. A partial access structure A = (S,R) is a pair of non-empty disjoint collections of subsets
R and S of 2P such that R is monotone and S is anti-monotone. Subsets in R are call qualified and subsets
in S are called unqualified.
A secret sharing scheme for A = (S,R) is a method by which a dealer who has a secret distributes shares
to n parties such that any subset in R can reconstruct the secret from its shares, while any subset in S can
not reveal any information on the secret.
Definition 4.11. A secret sharing scheme of a secret S for a partial access structure A = (S,R) over n
parties is the collection of random variables S1, . . . ,Sn with the following properties:
Reconstruction. For every B ∈ R, H(S|(Si : i ∈ B)) = 0.
Secrecy. For every B ∈ S, H(S|(Si : i ∈ B)) = H (S).
In particular, we say that a scheme is (s, r, n)-ramp scheme if its partial access structure A = (S,R) is given
by S = {B : |B| ≤ s} and R = {B : |B| ≥ r}, where s, r, n are all integers and 0 ≤ s < r ≤ n.
Therefore, by the definition above, when ǫ = 0, it is easy to see that X1, . . . ,Xn form a (k, n, n)-ramp
scheme for secret I. Recall the bound we have obtained
n∑
i=1
H(Xi) ≥
n
n− k
H(I) (∗)
We will soon see that this bound can not be improved by using only Shannon-type inequalities, i.e.,
I (X;Y |Z) ≥ 0.
In the context of secret sharing scheme, we call a (s, r, n)-ramp scheme optimal if it has the property
that H (Si) = H (S) /(r− s) for i = 1, . . . , n. In fact, for arbitrary (s, r, n), an optimal (s, r, n)-ramp scheme
always exists [25, Theorem 9], which means (∗) is tight if we can allow I,X1, . . . ,Xn to follow some certain
distributions, regardless of restrictions from their definition. However we can not, since at least it is clear
15
that I is a 1-bit binary secret. To our best knowledge, there is still no non-trivial result for this case to some
extent. A most relevant result for 1-bit binary secret is that recently, Bogdanov et al. [24] and Cascudo et
al. [26] prove that for 1 ≤ s < r < n, any (s, r, n)-ramp secret sharing scheme must have share size at least
max
{
log
n− s+ 1
r − s
, log
r + 1
r − s
}
where share size is defined as maxi=1,...,n{H0 (Si)}, in which H0 (X) is the Hartley entropy, or Re´nyi entropy
of order 0, given by the logarithm of the size of the support of X.
More generally, consider an OR algorithm Π on an arbitrary underlying graph G = (V,E). Suppose I is
still uniformly distributed on {Iu, Iv} with some chosen u, v ∈ V . Then, by Corollary 3.3, all Se = h
ηΠG(I,R)
e
for e ∈ E form a secret sharing scheme for secret I with access structure A = (S,R), where R ⊆ 2E consists
of all subsets of E whose removal disconnects u from v in G, and S is not necessarily specified. An interesting
thing is that, in a sense, this access structure looks like a dual structure of the undirected s-t-connectivity
structure [27, Section 3.2].7
5 Discussion
5.1 Tightness Issue on Our Bounds
For the deterministic case, the canonical convergecast algorithm [18] can be modified to be an OR algorithm
with a good performance. To be specific, we can choose an undirected spanning tree Y of underlying graph
G = (V,E). Let t be chosen as a “root” of Y . Denote the depth of a node v in tree Y as dY (v) = dY (v, t).
The parent of a node is the node connected to it on the path to the root t. Then, it is elementary to see
that Algorithm 5.1 is an OR algorithm on G with target set T = {t}, where n = |V |.
Algorithm 5.1 Convergecast
1: // code for node v with input i = I(v) ∈ {0, 1}
2: initially x← i
3: upon receiving a message 〈m〉 from any neighbor do
4: x← x ∨m
5: end upon
6: upon it is round n− dY (v) do
7: if v = t then
8: return x
9: else
10: send a message 〈x〉 to v’s parent
11: return
12: end if
13: end upon
Let Π0(Y ) represent the algorithm. Because of its simple behavior, the performance can be determined
easily as follows.8 

Φ
Π0(Y )
G,T (F ) = log n+
∑
Vi
ni
n
log
ni
n
Ψ
Π0(Y )
G,T (F ) = 0
αG(Π0(Y )) = n− 1
where n = |V |, ni = |Vi|, and Vi runs through node set of every connected component in graph (V,E(Y )−F ),
in which E(Y ) is determined by Y = (V,E(Y )).
By applying Π0(Y ) on underlying graph Kn, the complete graph of order n, where Y consists of one
internal node t and n− 1 leaves, we immediately get that the bound given by Theorem 3.8 is asymptotically
7Of course, actually they have no mathematical relationship.
8We omit the proof since it is easy and not relatively important.
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tight. Theorem 3.6 is certainly not asymptotically tight for dense underlying graph since in this case the
bound it gives is rather weaker than that from Theorem 3.8. However, it seems like that on many sparse
underlying graphs, the anonymity leakage for Π0(Y ) is not far away from the bound given by Theorem 3.6,
if we choose an appropriate Y . As for Theorem 4.6 an Theorem 4.9, we know little about tightness concerns.
For the randomized case, an interesting problem is that, can we design an randomized OR algorithm Π
on a given underlying graph G, which always reachs the bound given by Theorem 3.4 for arbitrary F? If
the answer is “yes”, the bound is absolutely tight in every sense.
5.2 Other Issues
Upper Bound of Anonymity Leakage. In this paper, we give a series of lower bounds of anonymity
leakage, while we know little about the upper bounds. At present, the best upper bound for the deterministic
case we know is given by Π0(Y ) introduced in the previous section. Does there exist a better general
deterministic OR algorithm, or a better one for some certain underlying graph? Also, it is meaningful to
find a good algorithm for the randomized case, or with threat model defined in Section 4.1.
Limitation of Our Model. Undoubtedly, the simplicity of our model brings us a lot of advantages, but
we lose something at the same time. As we mentioned at the beginning of this paper, our model is not
well compatible with cryptography. Also, a real-world anonymous communication system may change its
topology even during a transmission, e.g., a new edge caused by a query for another node’s IP address. Such
a function apparently could not be implemented within our model.
Flexibility of Our Model. Throughout this paper, we only consider an external passive adversary whose
ability is to observe some edges. However, we could get parallel results when the adversary is still passive
but internal (i.e., its ability is to observe some processors) with almost the same method we have used. If
we want to study the case an adversary is internal and active, which means that there are some nodes in the
control of the adversary, then, it is equivalent to say that the adversary’s ability is to hold some Byzantine
nodes [22] in our model.
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A Appendix
The proof of the following inequality is attributed to Fedor Petrov.
Theorem A.1. Let n,m, n1, n2, . . . , nk ∈ Z
+ such that m < n =
∑k
i=1 ni. Then,
−
k∑
i=1
ni
n
log
ni
n
≥
∑k
i=1min{ni,m} −m
n−m
log
n
m
.
18
Proof. (modified from [28]) Assume that n1, . . . , nt < m 6 nt+1, . . . , nk. Denote pi = ni/n, a = m/n. Let
H(p) = −p log p be the entropy function. What we want to prove is
k∑
i=1
H(pi) ≥
p1 + · · ·+ pt + a(k − t− 1)
1− a
log a−1.
Note that H(p) is concave function, thus we have H(pi) > H(a) · (pi/a) for i ≤ t and H(pi) ≥ H(a) · (1 −
pi)/(1 − a) for i > t. Substituting these estimates for H(pi) to the left-hand site and simplifying we get
exactly right-hand side.
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